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Abstract
War crimes are among the most serious crimes; that is why international courts and
tribunals have jurisdiction to prosecute and punish them. However, serious though
they are, it is not legitimate to punish them in such a way as to exceed the bounds of
respect for human rights. The author considers that, when the perpetrators of war
crimes are prosecuted and punished, criteria inherent to the rule of law like those
applied by the European Court of Human Rights (such as legality and
proportionality) must be met.
The process of establishing norms governing sanctions is not exempt from the
need to satisfy guarantees that are fundamental to the rule of law. Whether these
norms enter domestic legal systems by virtue of legislation or case law (as in
common-law countries) or whether they remain confined to international law,
* The author would like to thank Professor Christian-Nils Robert most warmly for reading the text and
for his very useful comments.
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they must comply with the fundamental principles inherent in the concept of
legality; otherwise such norms could only be seen as arbitrary and meaningless.
In the context of the prosecution and punishment of war crimes, the rapid
development of norms over the past fifteen years (since the establishment of the
international criminal courts and tribunals) may give the impression that the
fundamental principles of criminal law have been pushed aside. The humanist
impetus that helped to bring those crimes, which previously went unpunished in
many instances, into the courtroom, at times overlooked some of the guarantees
inherent in the rule of law. In the limited spaced available to me here I shall
attempt to review these guarantees, respect for which must be considered a
priority.
My analysis will cover four principles: legality, necessity, proportionality
and non-retroactivity.
Although it is not the only institution involved in this development, the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg has played a major role
in the modern expression of the principles set out above. I shall therefore analyse
the various material criteria relating to each of those principles in the light of the
relevant case law. The ECtHR also has the advantage of applying to, and covering,
both Romano-Germanic and common-law systems. It therefore represents a
framework very close to that of international criminal law. Furthermore, it has a
very significant influence on the current jurisprudence of the International
Criminal Court, as evinced from the latter’s recent judgments.1
The principle of legality
Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights defines the principle of
legality as follows:
No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or
omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or
international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier
penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal
offence was committed.
To comply with this principle, the law must precisely define a social act as
a crime and prescribe the penalty it carries.2 By so doing, it guards against
arbitrariness and allows citizens to regulate their social conduct. Legal security is
dependent on this condition.
The law defines in advance those acts which are to be prohibited by the
criminal law. Its role is to isolate the crime as a social fact, a distinct entity, and to
punish the person who commits it. In other words, application of the maxim
1 In this regard see Elizabeth Baumgartner’s article in this issue of the International Review of the Red
Cross.
2 ECtHR, Achour v. France, Application No. 67335/01, 29 March 2006, para. 41.
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nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege presupposes that (i) the person concerned is the
perpetrator of an act or omission which is objectively defined (an omission may
also be a crime); and (ii) that this act or omission is defined as a crime by the law.
When it comes to punishment, the law has the same role to play. It cannot
simply state that particular acts are criminal and leave it up to the judges to punish
them as they see fit. ‘‘These qualitative requirements must be satisfied as regards
both the definition of an offence and the penalty the offence in question carries.’’3
Otherwise the result would be the same as if there were no principle of legality
relating to offences, and that would be absurd. So the law must specify the penalty.
Today, specifically material criteria predominate in the definition of the
principle of legality. Accordingly, the author and form of the source carry less weight
in the interpretation of that principle than was the case when it was first formulated.4
It is important to point out at the outset that the ‘‘law’’, the cornerstone of the
principle nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, today encompasses not only written
sources of lawbut also amore general body of rules which includes case law, andmore
broadly the law of common-law countries.5
Three criteria will be examined: foreseeability, quality and accessibility as
applied to the law.6 They are closely interconnected, the foreseeability of the law
being contingent on its quality and accessibility. Indeed, foreseeability is one of the
crucial elements inherent to the principle of legality as applied to offences and
penalties. In pursuance of its aim of protecting society and above all individual
freedom (and hence legal security), the principle of foreseeability requires that the
citizen knows what facts will give rise to criminal proceedings and what penalties
are associated with them. That being the case, foreseeability cannot be viewed in
isolation from the quality of the law7 and its accessibility to the citizen. If the
citizen is unable to understand the law or has no access to it, foreseeability must
remain an unattained ideal.
In regard to penalties, as confirmed by European case law, these
conditions must also be specifically met: ‘‘the concept of the legality of a penalty
implies not only that the said penalty has a legal basis but that the law itself meets
the conditions of accessibility and foreseeability’’.8
The quality of the law will reside in the clarity and precision of the
provision, while accessibility will be determined by more casuistic enquiry (using
cases and analogies) and may be of a more limited nature.9 These criteria will give
rise to foreseeability, which we shall examine subsequently.
3 ECtHR, Kafkaris v. Cyprus, Application No. 21906/04, 12 February 2008, para. 140.
4 CesareBeccaria,Des de´lits et des peines, trans.M.Chevallier, preface byR. Badinter, Flammarion, Paris, 1991.
5 ECtHR, Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, Application No. 6538/74, 26 April 1979, para. 47.
6 Ibid., para. 49.
7 Le´on Julliot de la Morandie`re, De la re`gle nulla poena sine lege, Sirey, Paris, 1910, pp. 60 ff.; Djoheur
Zerouki, ‘‘La le´galite´ criminelle: Enrichissement de la conception formelle par une conception
mate´rielle’’, doctoral thesis, Universite´ Jean Moulin-Lyon 3, 2001, p. 264.
8 ECtHR, Commission Report, Gragnic v. France, 29 June 1994, para. 32 (published in French only,
author’s translation).
9 Fre´de´ric Sudre, ‘‘Le principe de la le´galite´ et la jurisprudence de la Cour europe´enne des droits de
l’homme’’, Revue pe´nitentiaire et de droit pe´nal, No. 1 (April 2001), pp. 335–56, p. 349.
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The quality of the law: clarity and precision
In laying down that any deprivation of liberty must be effected ‘‘in accordance
with a procedure prescribed by law’’, Article 5 para. 1 … primarily requires
any arrest or detention to have a legal basis in domestic law [in accordance
with the] quality of the law …
In order to ascertain whether a deprivation of liberty has complied with the
principle of compatibility with domestic law, it therefore falls to the Court to
assess not only the legislation in force in the field under consideration, but
also the quality of the other legal rules applicable to the persons concerned.
Quality in this sense implies that where a national law authorises deprivation
of liberty … it must be sufficiently … precise, in order to avoid all risk of
arbitrariness.10
The requirement that a criminal law be precise, as set out in the seminal judgment
Sunday Times v. United Kingdom,11 goes hand in hand with the requirement that
an offence must be clearly defined. The ECtHR again expressed this view in the
case of Kokkinakis v. Greece.12
But what constitutes a clear and precise law? The case law of the ECtHR
court gives a partial reply to that questionwhen it asserts that the clarity of the law can
be evaluated only on condition that the party concerned benefits from ‘‘appropriate
advice’’.13 According to the Cantoni judgment, this advice must allow the party ‘‘to
assess, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a
given action may entail (see, among other authorities, the Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the
United Kingdom judgment of 13 July 1995, Series A no. 316-B, p. 71, para. 37). This is
particularly true in relation to persons carrying on a professional activity, who are
used to having to proceed with a high degree of caution when pursuing their
occupation. They can on this account be expected to take special care in assessing the
risks that such activity entails.14’’
The axiom ‘‘ignorance of the law is no defence’’ is very extensively
accepted on the international level and should be applied in the same way to the
states or parties to the European Convention on Human Rights. To understand
the law, therefore, it is necessary to benefit from appropriate advice.
The Court considers that the criterion of clarity must also be met when it
comes to penalties, as it states that ‘‘offences and the relevant penalties must be
clearly defined by law’’.15
As for the precision of the law, this is only relative and may be limited.
The Court has stated in a number of judgments that it has ‘‘already noted that the
10 ECtHR, Amuur v. France, Application No. 19776/92, 25 June 1996, para. 50 (emphasis added).
11 Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, above note 5, para. 49.
12 ECtHR, Kokkinakis v. Greece, Application No. 14307/88, 25 May 1993, para. 52.
13 Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, above note 5, para. 49.
14 ECtHR, Cantoni v. France, Application No. 17862/91, 15 November 1996, para. 35.
15 ECtHR, Coe¨me and others v. Belgium, Applications No. 32492/96, 32547/96, 32548/96, 33209/96 and
33210/96, 22 June 2000, para. 145.
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wording of many statutes is not absolutely precise. The need to avoid excessive
rigidity and to keep pace with changing circumstances means that many laws are
inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague’’.16 It has
also mentioned the ‘‘impossibility of attaining absolute precision in the framing of
laws’’,17 especially in spheres of conduct where the particulars are in constant
evolution in line with the conceptions of society.18 Thus the Court acknowledges
that a system of law may have recourse to ‘‘one of the standard techniques of
regulation by rules [which] is to use general categorisations as opposed to
exhaustive lists’’.19
Finally, precision and clarity must be assessed in the overall context of the
text in question. A provision which is in itself imprecise may become clear when
read together with other articles of the same law.20 In a case where the ‘‘law taken
as a whole was not formulated with sufficient precision as to enable the applicant
to discern, even with appropriate advice, to a degree that was reasonable in the
circumstances, the scope of the penalty of life imprisonment and the manner of its
execution’’, the ECtHR concluded that Article 7 of the Convention had been
violated.21 Thus precision and clarity in a legal rule are achieved by the
combination of a text and clear case law, which together support the criteria
relating to foreseeability. The possibility that the law might not be clear and
comprehensible to someone with no legal training cannot be ruled out, as the
person concerned is expected to seek appropriate advice in order to foresee the
consequences of the law. I therefore take a critical view of such an interpretation of
the precision and clarity that a rule has to possess. It would seem evident that
understanding of a law should not be dependent on explanation in the form of
‘‘appropriate advice’’.
To these criteria must be added the necessary accessibility of criminal
law, in particular, which will be interpreted in a more ambivalent or ‘‘limited’’
way.22
Accessibility of the law
According to the case law of the ECtHR, the condition of accessibility is defined as
follows: ‘‘the citizen must be able to have an indication that is adequate in the
16 Kokkinakis v. Greece, above note 12, para. 40; see also ECtHR, Mu¨ller and others v. Switzerland,
Application No. 10737/84, 24 May 1988, para. 29; ECtHR, Olsson v. Sweden, Application No. 10737/84,
24 March 1988, para. 61; Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, above note 5, para. 49.
17 ECtHR, Barthold v. Germany, Application No. 8734/79, 25 March 1985, para. 47.
18 Ibid.
19 Cantoni v. France, above note 14, para. 31.
20 European Commission of Human Rights, G. v. Liechtenstein, 30 October 1984, cited in Zerouki, above
note 7, p. 308.
21 Kafkaris v. Cyprus, above note 3, para. 150. In this judgment the Court unfortunately considered that the
finding of such violation constituted in itself sufficient equitable satisfaction for any moral damage
suffered by the applicant.
22 Sudre, above note 9, p. 349.
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circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a given case’’.23 Penalties fall within
the scope of these ‘‘legal rules’’, as does the definition of an offence.
Accessibility is assessed in practical terms.24 It appears that the condition
is met as long as there is a published text relating to the matter at hand, whether in
the form of a law or of case law.25 Finally, as the ECtHR has pointed out, the law
does not need to be accessible to everyone; to meet the criterion, it must be
accessible to the persons concerned26 and those persons must be able to gain access
to it in practice, if need be by taking ‘‘appropriate advice’’.27 I refer to my earlier
critical remarks in this connection.
Foreseeability
To meet the criterion of foreseeability, a law must first meet the criteria examined
above. However, it is important to look specifically at the criterion of foreseeability
in order to grasp its full implications.
Following the ECtHR, certain authors have qualified foreseeability,
specifying that it should be relative or reasonable. Individuals have to be able to
‘‘assess, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences
which a given action may entail’’.28 This is a clear indication that foreseeability is
not absolute; it must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. As demonstrated by
Zerouki, the adjective ‘‘reasonable’’ must be interpreted a contrario: anything that
is unreasonable, unexpected or surprising cannot fulfil the requirement of
foreseeability.29
It follows that, when an interpretation is made by analogy and to the
detriment of the applicant, this is unreasonable.30 A ‘‘sudden’’ jurisprudential
about-turn which is unfavourable to the accused, and which the applicant could
not have expected, is deemed to be a violation of the principle of legality. Such a
decision appears logical and respectful of individual freedoms.
However, it would certainly have been too easy to leave it at that. There
may be circumstances in which external facts should cause the applicant to be
aware that a jurisprudential reversal could occur or that an act that is not a crime
and which it might be difficult to conceive of as a crime might nevertheless be
criminal in certain circumstances.
23 Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, above note 5, para. 49.
24 ECtHR, K.-H.W. v. Germany, Application No. 37201/97, 22 March 2001, para. 73; a contrario see
Kokkinakis v. Greece, above note 12, para. 40.
25 Kokkinakis v. Greece, above note 12, para. 40.
26 ECtHR, Groppera Radio AG and others v. Switzerland, Application No. 10890/84, 28 March 1990, para.
68.
27 ECtHR, Pessino v. France, Application No. 40403/02, 10 October 2006, para. 36. A contrario, in this case
the Court considered that it was impossible even for a professional, who could benefit from appropriate
advice, to foresee the Appeal Court’s reversal of case law.
28 Cantoni v. France, above note 14, para. 35; Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, above note 5, para. 49.
29 Zerouki, above note 7, p. 311.
30 Pessino v. France, above note 27.
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It seems that two factors may be relevant in this regard. First of all, the
court has considered that a change in mores and social attitudes may lead to
recognition of a right, even if the rules of criminal law would appear to indicate
otherwise. The case of S.W. v. United Kingdom is revealing in this respect: ‘‘[T]he
abandonment of the unacceptable idea of a husband being immune against
prosecution for rape of his wife was in conformity not only with a civilized
concept of marriage but also, and above all, with the fundamental objectives of the
Convention, the very essence of which is respect for human dignity and human
freedom.’’31 In a case such as this, changes in social attitudes, because they are in
conformity with the objectives of the Convention (the protection of fundamental
rights), lead to a degree of foreseeability, in accordance with Article 7.
Second, the ECtHR expresses the view that the more serious the offence in
objective terms, the more the citizen should expect it to be a crime subject to
punishment. The Pessino v. France judgment, referring to the case of S.W. v.
United Kingdom, states, ‘‘The Court considers that the present case is clearly
different from the S.W. v. United Kingdom and C.R. v. United Kingdom judgments
… which related to a rape and an attempted rape perpetrated by two men on their
wives. The Court observed in those judgments [that] ‘‘the essentially debasing
character of rape [was] so manifest’’ that the criminalization of such acts
committed by men on their wives was foreseeable, could not be said to be ‘‘at
variance with the object and purpose of Article 7 (art. 7) of the Convention …’’,
and ‘‘was in conformity … with the fundamental objectives of the Convention, the
very essence of which is respect for human dignity and human freedom.32’’
Does this mean that a domestic court could prosecute and punish an
offence considered to be serious as a crime without falling foul of the criterion of
foreseeability as understood by the ECtHR, even where there was no such
provision in the law, and that its perpetrator could therefore be arbitrarily
punished? On the basis of these judgments we should be inclined to reply in the
affirmative, subject to future case law, for the question of reasonable foreseeability
before the ECtHR remains somewhat ambiguous and difficult to categorize. In the
case of S.W. v. United Kingdom, ‘‘the Court appears to state that the applicant
should have foreseen that his behaviour would give rise to prosecution and
punishment, because he could not have been unaware that this conduct was, if not
legally, then morally reprehensible’’.33 If this is so, is it not dangerous to link the
law with morality? Indeed, some have associated that link with the legal systems
prevailing in certain dictatorships.34
Finally, it should be noted that the principle laid down by the ECtHR
amounts to prohibition of an interpretation by analogy which is in malam partem
– that is, to the detriment of the accused. That prohibition is directly connected
31 ECtHR, S.W. v. United Kingdom, Application No. 20166/92, 22 November 1995, para. 44.
32 Pessino v. France, above note 27, para. 36.
33 Se´bastien Van Drooghenbroeck, Interpre´tation jurisprudentielle et non-re´troactivite´ de la loi pe´nale, in
Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’Homme, 1996, p. 475 (author’s translation).
34 Zerouki, above note 7, p. 434.
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with respect for the principle of legality. However, as we have seen in the cases
cited earlier,35 the preponderant criterion to be applied is not the detrimental
nature of the outcome for the convicted person but that of reasonable
foreseeability, which consequently applies to the interpretation adopted by the
judge. This leads to the conclusion that any new, foreseeable interpretation must
meet the criteria of necessity and respect for the principle of legality, and hence the
requirements of legal security. As Zerouki points out in this regard, ‘‘if the mere
possibility of a new legal interpretation suffices to make it reasonably foreseeable,
the goal of safety is a long way off’’.36 Indeed, in the light of the way in which this
reasoning is applied by the Court, it would appear that it is permissible for the
sentence of life imprisonment to be mentioned in a law as the penalty for any
violation of that law, and that all sentences would thereby become foreseeable.
That would be problematic in terms of respect for individual freedoms. However,
other criteria besides legality apply, among them that of necessity.
The principle of necessity or consideration of the purpose of the
penalty
The matter of necessity must be approached, obviously in response to the offence
committed but first and foremost in response to the objectives pursued by the
penal sanction. As far back as 1874, J. J. Haus wrote that ‘‘[t]he penalty protects
Society by the effects it produces; but it cannot be justified by its usefulness alone;
it must also be a necessary, indeed indispensable, means of protection; for if by
means of less rigorous measures Society could achieve the same result, it would
not be entitled to dispense repressive justice.37’’
Necessity is defined, both in everyday language and in the context that
concerns us, as that which is imperative, which cannot be otherwise, which is an
obligation. Yet how can an obligation be judged in relation to the quantum of a
penalty? That is a delicate undertaking and can be only relatively ‘‘arbitrary’’,
especially if necessity is defined in absolute terms and allows for no comparison.
We therefore turn to the aims of the sanction in order to clarify the concept of
necessity.
The literature generally agrees that criminal sanctions have four main
aims: resocialization, deterrence (or special prevention), neutralization and general
prevention. The principle of necessity should not only be observed mainly through
the prism of defence of society (general prevention), but also in relation to special
prevention. As for neutralization, the relevant principle is that of proportionality,
which I shall examine subsequently. In regard to general prevention, I would
35 S.W. v. United Kingdom, above note 31.
36 Zerouki, above note 7, p. 433 (author’s translation).
37 Jacques Joseph Haus, Le fondement du droit de punir, 1874; available at http://ledroitcriminel.free.fr/
la_science_criminelle/les_sciences_juridiques/introduction/haus_fondement_punir.htm (last visited 29
May 2008, author’s translation).
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simply point out that, ex hypothesi and as Professor Robert has argued, it is a
principle that is ‘‘impossible to prove scientifically and … impossible to
deconstruct ideologically’’.38 As it would be impossible to examine the other
aims of a penalty in such a brief overview, I shall leave that discussion to others
with more expertise than I.39 Although in this brief outline I shall not examine
all the implications of resocialization, it would seem important to focus on the
sentence of life imprisonment, which is the penalty laid down for war crimes in
many domestic legal systems. That being the case, we must ask ourselves
whether such a penalty is compatible with the aim of resocialization of the
criminal.
Resocialization is indisputably one of the aims of penal sanctions, but it
cannot be achieved by a life sentence for the simple reason that the criminal will
never be released into society. Many authors nowadays see a life sentence as a form
of torture, an inhuman and degrading punishment, and call for its abolition.40 At
all events, by its very nature it cannot serve to resocialize criminals. As pointed out
by P. Poncela, ‘‘there is general agreement that after about 15 years in prison an
individual begins to disintegrate, and can no longer take part in any reintegration
project’’.41 Moreover, a life sentence ‘‘kills the detainee by inches’’;42 it is a penalty
that the French Constituent Assembly succeeded in abolishing in 1791 as it was
considered to be ‘‘worse than death’’.43 Life sentences therefore have no
justification, especially in an international system that advocates humane values
for all human beings, whether or not they are war criminals or perpetrators of
genocide. Moreover, certain European states have already abolished the life
sentence (Cyprus, Norway, Portugal and Spain). We might have hoped to see the
ECtHR support these humanistic and apparently pioneering decisions. Although it
has found that the imposition of a life sentence per se was not contrary to Article 3
of the Convention,44 the Court has on several occasions expressed the view that
imposing a life sentence without parole on an adult could raise an issue under
Article 3.45 Moreover, in its judgment in the case of Selmouni v. France of 28 June
1999, when interpreting Article 3, a fundamental provision in the Convention
system, the Court gave an interpretation to the effect that ‘‘the increasingly high
38 Christian-Nils Robert, ‘‘Le roˆle de la sanction (dans l’approche inte´gre´e de la justice et de la
re´conciliation)’’, in Colloque a` Sanremo: Justice et Re´conciliation, 7–9 September 2006 (unpublished,
author’s translation).
39 Christian-Nils Robert, L’impe´ratif sacrificiel, Justice pe´nale au-dela` de l’innocence et de la culpabilite´, ed.
d’en bas, Lausanne, 1986; A. C. Berghuis, ‘‘La pre´vention ge´ne´rale: limites et possibilite´s’’, in Les objectifs
de la sanction pe´nale, en hommage a` Lucien Slachmuylder, Bruylant, Brussels, 1989, pp. 23–68; Pierrette
Poncela, Droit de la Peine, PUF, Paris, 1995.
40 For France: Pierrette Poncela and Pierre Lascoumes, Re´former le Code pe´nal, PUF, Paris, 1998, p. 178. In
Germany, this features in the political programme of the Green party: Fraktion Bu¨ndis 90/Gru¨ne,
Lebendig begraben, lebenslange Freiheitsstrafe und Resozialisierung, ein Dauerwiderspruch, Bonn, 1991.
41 Pierrette Poncela, ‘‘Perpe´tuite´, suˆrete´ perpe´tuelle: la peine de mort a` petit feu, entretien accorde´ a`
Hommes et Liberte´s’’, Revue de la ligue des droits de l’homme, No. 116 (2001) (author’s translation).
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 CEDH, Sawoniuk v. Royaume-Uni, Application No. 63716/00, Decision on admissibility, 29 May 2005.
45 CEDH, Nivette v. France, Application No. 44190/98, Decision on admissibility, 3 July 2001.
Volume 90 Number 870 June 2008
351
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383108000350
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 17:35:15, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
standard being required in the area of the protection of human rights and
fundamental liberties correspondingly and inevitably requires greater firmness in
assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic societies’’.46 We might
therefore have expected a judgment finding that life imprisonment is contrary to
Article 3 of the Convention. Unfortunately, only very recently, the ECtHR
delivered a judgment that ran counter to such hopes: life imprisonment without
parole (in the case in question, release would have been possible only by means of
a presidential pardon) is not a violation of Article 3.47 Let us nevertheless take note
of the fact that the decision was adopted by a very narrow majority (ten votes to
seven).
Necessity is also applied in connection with the principles of
proportionality and non-retroactivity, or again that of retroactivity in mitius. In
regard to proportionality, the link is obvious: to be necessary, a penalty must be
proportionate. As for retroactivity, as soon as an accusation is quashed or a
penalty reduced, there is certainly no longer any necessity for it – supposing that
there ever was.
The principle of proportionality
The principle of proportionality is directly related to the principle of necessity, and
forms what Poncela calls the ‘‘just moderation’’48 of the penalty. Proportionality
must be examined principally in the relationship between the crime and the penal
sanction.49 Other factors that have to be taken into consideration are the harm
‘‘caused and feared’’, the criminal record of the accused, if any, and any
aggravating or mitigating circumstances.50 Bentham expressed the opinion that
‘‘the value of the punishment must … outweigh that of the profit of the offence’’,51
but also that the greater the crime, the greater the justification for hazarding a
severe penalty in the hope of preventing it.52 Subsequently this principle came to
occupy an important place in penology, even though it is obviously difficult to
apply clear arithmetic to the question of what punishment a crime should entail.
According to this theory, the quantum is fixed on an arbitrary basis by the law,
which may apply various criteria such as the gravity of the crime and the suffering
of the victims, but also aggravating and mitigating circumstances relating to the
perpetrator or to the crime itself.
Several criteria connected with proportionality are applied by the ECtHR.
Proportionality is regularly expressed in terms of ‘‘appropriate and adequate’’
46 Kafkaris v. Cyprus, above note 3, partially dissenting opinion of judges Tulkens, Cabral Barreto, Fura-
Sandstro¨m and Spielmann, para. 101.
47 Kafkaris v. Cyprus, above note 3, para. 140.
48 Poncela, above note 39, p. 38.
49 Maurica Cusson, Pourquoi punir?, Dalloz, Paris, 1987, pp. 87–8.
50 Ibid., pp. 157–69.
51 Ibid., p. 170.
52 Ibid., p. 171.
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measures to be taken by national authorities.53 Disproportion is found in the
quantitatively immoderate, excessive, unjustified nature of a sanction as compared
with the objective pursued. In some cases, the Court has considered as
disproportionate measures which could have been replaced by less restrictive
solutions.54
Finally, in the context of legality as defined by the case law of the ECtHR
(using the criteria of foreseeability, accessibility and clarity), proportionality is
becoming a key concept. Indeed, as the ‘‘foreseeability of the law’’ is assuming
rather ‘‘extra-ordinary’’ forms in terms of the foreseeability of its application in
case law, it is becoming necessary for this rule, or should we say this law, to respect
the principle of proportionality in the effects it generates. This appears all the more
important when it comes to the jurisprudential mode of enforcing the law. In
various decisions the Court has thus applied the principle of proportionality when
assessing the foreseeable or ‘‘non-accomplished’’ enforcement of the law by
domestic courts. Without again going into the details of this ‘‘foreseeability’’ of
case law which we examined earlier, it should be borne in mind that the courts
must not go beyond that which could reasonably be expected in the circumstances
of the case,55 the aim for the court being to ‘‘be satisfied that … there exist
adequate and effective guarantees against abuse’’56 or ‘‘arbitrary interference’’.57
Proportionality is already established in the very text of the Convention,
but it has also given rise to abundant and wide-ranging case law. In the majority of
cases, proportionality tends to emerge from cases relating to Articles 8 to 11 of the
Convention, which guarantee the right to respect for private and family life and
respect for home and correspondence, and the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion, freedom of expression and freedom of association.
Apart from these various rights to which proportionality has become
attached, the ECtHR has had occasion to lay down the principle of proportionality
in criminal matters, in association with Article 3 of the Convention, which
prohibits inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This context is of
particular interest, as it is very closely connected with my research. The Court’s
jurisprudence, however, has two facets which need to be clarified.
On the one hand there is older jurisprudence which holds that the
Convention does not recognize as such any right to call into question the length of
a sentence regularly imposed by a competent court,58 and holding that the mere
fact that an offence is dealt with more severely in one country than in another is
insufficient to establish inhuman or degrading punishment.59 The ECtHR has also
found that the length of a sentence could raise an issue under Article 3 only in the
53 ECtHR, New Verlags Gmbh & CoKG v. Austria, Application No. 31457/96, 11 January 2000, para. 54.
54 ECtHR, Informationsverein Lentia and others v. Austria, applications No. 13914/88;15041/89;15717/89,
24 November 1993; para. 39.
55 Barthold v. Germany, above note 17, para. 48.
56 ECtHR, Klass and others v. Germany, Application No. 5029/71, 6 September 1978, para. 50.
57 ECtHR, Kruslin v. France, Application No. 11801/85, 24 April 1990, para. 30.
58 ECtHR, X. v. United Kingdom (inadmissible), Application No. 5871/71, 30 September 1974, p. 54.
59 ECtHR, unpublished, Application No. 11615/85, 10 December 1985.
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most exceptional circumstances.60 A certain dichotomy already seems to be
emerging between these terms, sometimes within one and the same decision.61 In
fact, although such circumstances mainly concern conditions of imprisonment,
there is no reason to believe that they might not lead back to the offence or the
surrounding circumstances and to the sentence pronounced.
On the other hand, in some more recent judgments the ECtHR seems to
leave a measure of latitude to consider the appropriateness of the duration of a
penal sanction, even if the statement of reasons is far from clear:
The Court notes first of all that a person may be humiliated by the mere fact
of being criminally convicted. However, what is relevant for the purposes of
Article 3 (art. 3) is that he should be humiliated not simply by his conviction
but by the execution of the punishment which is imposed on him. In fact, in
most if not all cases this may be one of the effects of judicial punishment,
involving as it does unwilling subjection to the demands of the penal system.
However, as the Court pointed out in its judgment of 18 January 1978 in
the case of Ireland v. the United Kingdom (Series A no. 25, p. 65, para. 163),
the prohibition contained in Article 3 (art. 3) of the Convention is absolute:
no provision is made for exceptions and, under Article 15 (2) (art. 15-2) there
can be no derogation from Article 3 (art. 3). It would be absurd to hold that
judicial punishment generally, by reason of its usual and perhaps almost
inevitable element of humiliation, is ‘‘degrading’’ within the meaning of
Article 3 (art. 3). Some further criterion must be read into the text. Indeed,
Article 3 (art. 3), by expressly prohibiting ‘‘inhuman’’ and ‘‘degrading’’
punishment, implies that there is a distinction between such punishment and
punishment in general.
In the Court’s view, in order for a punishment to be ‘‘degrading’’ and in
breach of Article 3 (art. 3), the humiliation or debasement involved must
attain a particular level and must in any event be other than that usual element
of humiliation referred to in the preceding subparagraph. The assessment is,
in the nature of things, relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case
and, in particular, on the nature and context of the punishment itself and the
manner and method of its execution.62
Furthermore, in the Soering judgment, in regard to the death penalty and
the so-called ‘‘death row’’ syndrome, which the condemned person risked being
exposed to in case of his extradition to the United States, the ECtHR court stated
as follows:
That does not mean however that circumstances relating to a death sentence
can never give rise to an issue under Article 3 (art. 3). The manner in which it
is imposed or executed, the personal circumstances of the condemned person
and a disproportionality to the gravity of the crime committed, as well as the
60 ECtHR, X. v. FRG (inadmissible), Application No. 7057/75, 13 May 1976, p. 127.
61 ECtHR, V. v. FRG, Application No. 11017/84, 13 March 1986, p. 178.
62 ECtHR, Tyrer v. United Kingdom, Application No. 5856/72, 25 April 1978, para. 30 (emphasis added).
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conditions of detention awaiting execution, are examples of factors capable of
bringing the treatment or punishment received by the condemned person
within the proscription under Article 3 (art. 3).63
Finally, in reference to the application of Article 10 (freedom of
expression), the ECtHR has also had occasion to apply the principle of
proportionality, in some cases even condemning a state for imposing a sanction
which, in the eyes of the Court, was out of proportion to the legitimate aim
pursued. In the Thorgeir Thorgeirsson case the Strasbourg judges considered that
‘‘the reasons advanced by the Government do not suffice to show that the
interference complained of [the penal sanctions] was proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued’’.64
The ECtHR places emphasis on proportionality, which must be respected
by legislation and the way it is applied by the relevant jurisdictions. Life
imprisonment, examined in connection with the principle of necessity, should
therefore been viewed in the light of proportionality; and it does not appear to
respect those principles, whatever the crime committed.
The principle of non-retroactivity in mitius
The principles of non-retroactivity and retroactivity in mitius are directly related
to the criterion of foreseeability, since they are the direct causes of its application.
Indeed, foreseeability demands that a law cannot be applied to acts committed
before it came into force. The criterion of foreseeability, as defined above, has to
be given concrete expression in legislative and jurisprudential practice. Now we
must look at the explicit prohibition on retroactivity of a criminal law, and hence
on the lawfulness or otherwise of retroactivity in mitius.
The ECtHR, applying the Convention and, in particular, its Article 7(1),
expressly lays down the prohibition on retroactivity. A distinction should be
drawn, however, between two forms of retroactivity: the ‘‘direct’’ form, which
corresponds to the coming into force of a new law after the offence has been
committed, and the ‘‘indirect’’ form, which corresponds to interpretation of the
law.
As regards the former, as already mentioned, the ECtHR merely takes up
in different terms the principle of non-retroactivity, saying that it is an inviolable
principle of law.65 Thus when a law is applied retroactively, the Court sees this as a
violation of Article 7(1).66 As for the latter, although a degree of retroactivity may
appear through the interpretation of laws, the Court has underlined the criteria
63 ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom, Application No. 14038/88, 7 July 1989, para. 104 (emphasis added).
64 ECtHR, Thorgeir Thorgeirsson v. Iceland, Application No. 13778/88, 25 June 1992, para. 69.
65 ECtHR, Kokkinakis v. Greece, above note 12, para. 52; K.-H.W. v. Germany, above note 24, para. 45;
ECtHR, Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany, applications No. 34044/96, 35532/97, 44801/98; and K.-
H.W. v. Germany, Application No. 37201/97, 22 March 2001, para. 50.
66 ECtHR, Jamil v. France, Application No. 15917/89, 8 June 1995, para. 35.
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that must be met if such interpretation is not to be synonymous with retroactivity
pure and simple. However, there is no need to review here the various criteria that
we examined earlier in connection with foreseeability.
Furthermore, the stated principle of non-retroactivity admits of one
possible exception, namely retroactivity in mitius, whereby a law may apparently
be applied retroactively as long as it is more lenient than the one applicable at the
time of the offence.67 In this connection, the ECtHR has declared inadmissible
complaints from applicants who argued that the principle of non-retroactivity had
been violated by the imposition of a life-sentence where only the death sentence
was provided for in the legislative texts governing the offences for which they had
been condemned. The Court considered that life imprisonment was more lenient
than the death sentence.68
Thus a more lenient law may be applied retroactively, as a departure from
the strict principle of the non-retroactivity of a penal law. The principle of lex
mitior is therefore recognized on the European level, as it is on the international
level by virtue of Article 15(1) of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.
Conclusion
This brief review of the criteria that must be met by the law demonstrates that
those criteria constitute essential guarantees for the observance of fundamental
freedoms.
If we follow the case law of the ECtHR, the principle of legality must be
given effect by ensuring that the law is characterized by clarity, accessibility and
foreseeability. The principles of necessity and proportionality are more limited and
subject to casuistic enquiry, even though their observance is an obligation in
criminal law. Finally, retroactivity is absolutely prohibited when it is to the
detriment of the accused, but may and indeed must be applied in his or her favour.
The ECtHR has had the merit of addressing in detail the various criteria
inherent in criminal law. However, it would appear from its case law that it has
begun to attribute to some of those criteria an interpretation that could be seen as
moving away from the protection of those very individual liberties it was set up to
protect. Two examples illustrate this risk. The first is the need for the citizen to
seek ‘‘appropriate advice’’. Taken to its logical conclusion, this could be construed
as meaning that the man in the street does not need to understand the law. It is
therefore important that the criterion not be interpreted too expansively. The
second example is the definition of foreseeability. There too, unless safeguards are
put in place, any sentence may be construed as foreseeable either if it is contained
67 Kokkinakis v. Greece, above note 12, para. 52; Convention, G. v. France, Application No. 15312/89 (Lack
of jurisdiction), judgment of 27 September 1995, para. 26.
68 EctHR, Karmo v. Bulgaria, Application No. 76965/01, Decision on admissibility, 9 February 2006;
Ivanov v. Bulgaria, Application No. 76942/01, Decision on admissibility, 5 January 2006.
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in the law, in the broad sense of the word, or if it is in keeping with develop-
ments in society. This example serves to demonstrate that the criteria inherent
in criminal law must be strictly defined if the prosecution and punishment of
crimes, including war crimes, is to remain circumscribed by fundamental
guarantees.
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